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THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE WEST
VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS IN
THE REVIEW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION APPEALS
DAviD M. FLANNERY*
JOSEPH S. BEESON**
M. ANN BRADLEY***
RICHARD P. GODDARD****

The November elections of 1976 brought about a major change
in the composition of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
Three new justices,' a majority of the court, were elected. The
consequences of the election have been widely felt throughout the
State. In no area has its impact been greater, however, than in the
area of workmen's compensation law.'
The court hs shown a great willingness to hear workmen's
compensation appeals.3 In reviewing such appeals, the court has
* B.S.E.E., West Virginia University, 1969; J.D., West Virginia University,
1972; Partner, Love, Wise, Robinson & Woodroe, Charleston, West Virginia.
** A.B., West Virginia Wesleyan College, 1968; J.D., West Virginia University, 1974; Partner, Love, Wise, Robinson & Woodroe, Charleston, West Virginia.
*** B.S. Ed., Miami University, 1969; J.D., University of.Miami, 1976; Associate, Love, Wise, Robinson & Woodroe, Charleston, West Virginia.
**** B.A., Oberlin College, 1974; Class of 1979, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
Justices Sam R. Harshbarger, Thomas B.Miller and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.
The remaining members of the court are Chief Justice Fred H. Caplan and Justice
Richard Neely.
2 The West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act [hereinafter referred to as
the "Act"] is presently codified in W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 to 23-5-6 (1978 Replacement Vol.). One reason for the inordinate influence of the court in workmen's
compensation matters is the fact that the Workmen's Compensation Fund is one
of only two state agencies from which direct appeals may be taken to the supreme
court of appeals. The other is the Public Service Commission. This fact may be
explained in part by the fact that the original Workmen's Compensation Fund was
administered by the Public Service Commission. Act of Feb. 21, 1913, ch. 10, § 1,
1913 W. Va. Acts 64, 66.
A review of the records of the supreme court of appeals with respect to its
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chosen to play an active role in the review of evidence, something
generally avoided by prior courts. There has been little reluctance
to substitute the majority's assessment of the evidence for the
factual findings of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board.'
In substantive law the court has likewise had great impact,
and in certain areas has taken action which would normally be
considered within the purview of the legislature. Most significantly, the statutory immunity to suit granted to employers by the
West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act, except in cases of
treatment of appeals in workmen's compensation matters since January 1, 1977,
resulted in the compilation of the following statistics. From January 1, 1977, to
September 15, 1978, employers and employees requested review from the supreme
court of appeals of eighty-four decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board. Review was requested by employers in only fourteen of those eighty-four
cases, or approximately seventeen percent of the total reviews requested. Employees requested review in seventy cases, or eighty-three percent of the total reviews
requested. The court granted review in sixty-one cases or seventy-three percent of
all appeals taken. During the twenty months since January, 1977, the court has
granted review in only one appeal by an employer. In contrast, the court has consented to hear sixty appeals by employees, approximately eighty-six percent of all
employee appeals and ninety-eight percent of the total appeals granted. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Beverly Reid, Charleston, West Virginia,
for her ihvaluable assistance in compiling the statistics utilized in this footnote and
throughout this article and, otherwise, for her considerable involvement in the
preparation of this article.
Final decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner may be appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board [hereinafter referred to as
"Appeal Board"] consisting of three members. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-2 (1978 Replacement Vol.). The Appeal Board is charged with hearing appeals de novo; Dillon
v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 129 W. Va. 223, 39 S.E.2d 837 (1946); and is required
to "enter such order or make such award as the commissioner should have
made. . .

."

W. VA. CODE § 23-5-3 (1978 Replacement Vol.). The Appeal Board

supplants the Commissioner as the sole fact finding body. E.g., Taylor v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 151 W. Va. 409, 151 S.E.2d 283 (1966); Rasmus v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 117 W. Va. 55, 184 S.E. 250 (1936). Appeal from a final order
of the Appeal Board may be taken directly to the supreme court of appeals. W. VA.
CODE § 23-5-4 (1978 Replacement Vol.). The court will reverse the findings of the
Appeal Board only if "clearly" or "plainly wrong." E.g., Johnson v. Workmen's
Comp. Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 624, 186 S.E.2d 771 (1972); Stewart v. Workmen's
Comp. Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 633, 186 S.E.2d 700 (1972); Kennedy v. Workmen's
Comp. Dir., 150 W. Va. 132, 144 S.E.2d 509 (1965); Vento v. Workmen's Comp.
Comm'r, 130 W. Va. 577, 44 S.E.2d 626 (1947). But see notes 181-201 infra and
accompanying text.
In the workmen's compensation decisions rendered from January 1, 1977, to
September 15, 1978, the court has held in favor of the employee on forty-nine
occasions. The court limited employer relief to only one case during this twentyone month period.
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intentional injury, has been altered 5 to an extent which will only
be finally determined by later cases. Other decisions have: liberalized the continuous exposure requirements of the occupational
pneumoconiosis provisions of the Act;' removed the requirement of
demonstrating aggravation of an existing occupational pneumoconiosis condition with a particular employer in order to be entitled to benefits; 7 extended the protection of a legislatively lengthened statute of limitations to claimants whose occupational pneumoconiosis claims were not yet barred when the new limitation
period became effective;' permitted concurrent recovery of benefits
in separate claims even though the total amount of benefits paid
exceeded statutory limits;9 liberalized requirements for reopening
0 and provided protection for innocent victims of horseclaims;"
11
play.
This article will assess the new court's role in reviewing both
substantive and procedural aspects of workmen's compensation
law. The discussion is divided into two broad areas: substantive
changes in West Virginia workmen's compensation law; and scope
of the court's review.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN WEST VIRGINIA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAw

A. Employer Immunity
The court's most significant decision focusing on workmen's
compensation is undoubtedly Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries,
2 In Mandolidis, the court construed several sections of the
Inc."
Workmen's Compensation Act 3 which expressly prohibit recovery
'Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).

Jarrell v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, No. 13968 (per curiam Nov. 22, 1977).
Maynard v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 239 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1977).
Lester v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1978).
Cropp v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 236 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1977).
' Harper v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 234 S.E.2d 779 (W. Va. 1977).

Sizemore v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 235 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1977).
246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978). The proper spelling of the plaintiff's name is
Manolidis. See Petition, Note of Argument and Brief on Behalf of Plaintiffs in
Error, James Manolidis and June Manolidis. The spelling adopted, by the court,
however, will be retained throughout this article.
11In 1913, the West Virginia Legislature enacted the Workmen's Compensation Fund Act of 1913, ch. 10, 1913 W. Va. Acts 64, the precursor of the State's
present Workmen's Compensation Act. The legislature had recognized the inequities of the State's common law system of compensation for work-related injuries.
Due largely to the availability to employers of common law defenses to claims by
"

1i
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of damages by an employee against his employer for a work-related
injury unless the injury results from the employer's "deliberate
intention."" Article 2, section 6 of the Act grants employers who
are subscribers to the workmen's compensation fund or selfinsurers of workmen's compensation benefits immunity from damages at common law or by statute for injury to or death of an
employee.15 This immunity is limited, however, to employers who
do not act with a deliberate intention to injure or cause the death
of an employee. Should injury to or death of an employee result
from the deliberate intention of the employer, Article 4, section 2
grants the employee or his survivors a cause of action against the
employer for any excess of damages over the amount received or
receivable under the Act. 6
employees, few workers injured in industrial accidents recovered compensation. See
generally 1 A.'LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§4.00-.50 (1978).
The legislature determined that public policy required that workers injured on the
job receive greater protection than that afforded by common law. Because of its
concern for the injured worker and his family, the legislature supplanted the common law with a no-fault Workmen's Compensation Fund. Under this system, workers injured in industrial accidents would be compensated regardless of fault, while,
as a trade-off, participating employers would enjoy a statutory immunity from
damage claims by the same workers. Through the provisions of the Act, the legislature sought to eliminate litigation and remove obstacles and delays which had
hindered the recovery of compensation by employees for industrial injuries. Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 252.53, 175 S.E. 70, 71-72 (1934);
see North v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 1974). For a brief
description of a typical workmen's compensation act, see 1 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1.00-.20 (1978). Since 1913 the legislature has periodically revised the original act.
" See W. VA. CODE §§ 23-2-6, -6a, and 23-4-2 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
" Article 2, section 6 provides, in relevant part:
Any employer subject to this chapter who shall subscribe and pay
into the workmen's compensation fund the premiums provided by this
chapter or who shall elect to make direct payments of compensation as
herein provided, shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law
or by statute for the injury or death of any employee, however occurring,
after so subscribing or electing, and during any period in which such
employer shall not be in default in the payment of such premiums or
direct payments and shall have complied fully with all other provisions
of this chapter.
W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (1978 Replacement Vol.). The legislature extended this grant
of immunity to all officers, managers, agents, representatives, and employees of the
employer so long as they act in furtherance of the employer's business and do not
inflict an injury with deliberate intent. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6a (1978 Replacement

Vol.).
, Article 4, section 2 of the Act provides, in part:
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate inten-
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As the basis for its review, the court consolidated three cases
for argument and decision: Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.,"7
Snodgrass v. United States Steel Corp.,8 and Dishmon v. Eastern
Associated Coal Corp."9 The plaintiff in Mandolidis had worked as
a machine operator and lost two fingers and part of his right hand
while operating a ten-inch table saw not equipped with a safety
guard. In his complaint, Mandolidis alleged: that his employer
refused to install a proper safety guard on the saw in knowing
violation of state and federal safety laws; that the employer knew
the consequences of ordering the use of the saw and similar machinery because other employees had been injured severely due to the
lack of safety guards; and that the employer ordered workers to use
the saw and other machinery without guards or be fired. Mandolidis also alleged that shortly before his own accident, federal safety
inspectors had cited the employer for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19 7 0 2 because the saw was not
equipped with a guard and had directed that no one use the saw
until the employer complied with the safety statutes. Mandolidis
claimed that shortly thereafter the employer returned the machine
to production and ordered workers to operate the saw without the
2
prescribed guard. Plaintiff's injury resulted. '
In Snodgrass, four workmen were injured and one was killed
when a metal cable dislodged a wooden platform on which they
were working and caused them to fall nearly twenty-five feet into
an excavation. Plaintiffs alleged that the injuries and death were
caused by defendant's failure to provide a safe place to work, failure to warn plaintiffs of the danger, and various violations of state
and federal safety laws.?
tion of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the

widow, widower, child or dependent of the employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of action against
the employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of
damages over the amount received or receivable under this chapter.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1978 Replacement Vol.). For a brief discussion of the deliberate intention statute, see Note, Workmen's Compensation-TheDeliberateIntent
Statute: Providingfor the Victims of Industry?, 72 W. VA. L. REV. 90 (1970).
17246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
Is Id.
"

Id.

29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678 (1970).
See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 at 914-15 (W. Va.
1978); Brief on behalf of Plaintiffs in Error at 5, 19-20.
n See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 at 916-17 (W. Va.
1978); Brief for Appellants at 2-5, Snodgrass v. United States Steel Corp., No. 13982
2
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Plaintiff's decedent in Dishmon had reported to defendant's
mine for work. Shortly thereafter, a large quantity of slate fell from
the roof of the work area and crushed the employee to death. Dishmon's widow filed suit and alleged that defendant deliberately,
wilfully, and wantonly allowed employees, including the decedent,
to work in conditions that violated federal and state safety laws
and regulations governing roof supports and the use of explosives
in mines." The plaintiffs in each of the three cases alleged that the
acts of each defendant produced a wilful and intentional injury,
resulting in the loss of statutory immunity. 4
The majority opinion in the Mandolidis decision is significant
both procedurally and substantively. All three defendants had
moved to dismiss the suits, claiming statutory immunity. Because
the defendants in Mandolidis and Snodgrass submitted affidavits
in support of their positions, the court treated their motions as
motions for summary judgment." Thus, the questions presented to
the respective trial courts in these two cases were whether plaintiffs presented a genuine issue of material fact and whether defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.26 The court
noted that the facts alleged by the plaintiffs in both Mandolidis
and Snodgrass differed sharply from the defendants' assertions
and presented genuine issues of fact which could directly affect the
(W. Va. June 27, 1978).
3 See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 at 919-20 (W. Va.
1978); Brief on behalf of Appellant at 1-3, Dishmon v. Eastern Assoe'd Coal Corp.,
No. 13983 (W. Va. June 27, 1978).
11 See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 at 915, 917, 920 (W.
Va. 1978).
21Id. at 917. The defendants in Mandolidis, Snodgrass, and Dishmon each
moved in the circuit court, pursuant to W. VA. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss the
action against them on the ground that they were entitled to immunity from suit
under the Act. See W. VA. Cone §§ 23-2-6, -9 (1978 Replacement Vol.). The defendants in Mandolidis and Snodgrass filed affidavits with and in support of their
motions to dismiss. When a party supports a motion to dismiss with matters outside
the pleadings, a court will treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to W. VA. R. Civ. P. 56.
n Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 917 (W. Va. 1978). In West
Virginia, a party who moves for summary judgment must demonstrate that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, and a court properly may grant the motion
only upon such a showing. Johnson v. Junior Pocahontas Coal Co., 234 S.E.2d 309,
315-16 (W. Va. 1977); Hanks v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 153 W. Va. 834, 83738, 172 S.E.2d 816, 818 (1970); Haga v. King Coal Chevrolet Co., 151 W. Va. 125,
132, 150 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1966); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 148 W.
Va. 160, 170-72, 133 S.E.2d 770, 777 (1963).
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outcome of the action.? The court, therefore, held that the trial
courts erred in dismissing the claims.? The court also reversed the
lower court's dismissal in Dishmon because it held that the allegations in the complaint, when taken as true, stated a claim for
relief.?
The Mandolidis decision, however, goes far beyond the mere
procedural questions raised in the three suits. First, the court held
that an employer acts with "deliberate intent to produce an injury
or death" and loses his immunity from common law actions by
employees whenever his conduct constitutes an intentional tort or
wilful, wanton, and reckless misconduct.? The court then defined
such conduct as action "undertaken with a knowledge and an appreciation of the high degree of risk of physical harm to another
created thereby. '31 Moreover, the court noted that evidence of
prior injuries or deaths resulting from working conditions or practices as well as the employer's knowledge of the existence and
contents of federal and state safety laws and regulations is admissible to establish an employer's knowledge of the risk of harm created by a course of conduct.2 Although the court affirmed a prior
holding that "gross negligence" is not to be equated with
"deliberate intent,"" the court implied that the jury, as the trier
of fact, should determine whether an employer's conduct exposes
him to tort liability.3
" See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 at 918-19 (W. Va.

1978).
n Id. at 918-19.
" Id. at 921.
3 Id. at 921. The court's redefinition of the "deliberate intent" provisions of
the Act is virtually identical to the test used to determine the appropriateness of
punitive damages in a civil action. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has held that punitive damages are appropriate where the defendant has acted with
bad motive, gross negligence, wantonly, recklessly, or wilfully; that is, in such
manner as to evidence a wilful disregard of the rights of others. Yates v. Crozer Coal
& Coke Co., 76 W. Va. 50, 84 S.E. 626 (1915); Talbott v. West Virginia C. & P.
Ry., 42 W. Va. 560, 26 S.E. 311 (1896); Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W. Va. 246, 22 S.E. 58
(1895). See Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968). In any
case, then, where the plaintiff is able to get to the jury on the question of "deliberate
intent," he should also be entitled to an instruction on punitive damages.
' Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (W. Va. 1978).
" Id. at 914 n.10.
Id. at 913-14, aff'g Maynard v.Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va.249, 253,
175 S.E. 70, 72 (1934); accord Eisnaugle v.Booth, 226 S.E.2d 259, 261 (W. Va.
1976); Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc., 135 W. Va.739, 750, 65 S.E.2d
87, 94 (1951); Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 636-37, 186
S.E. 612, 614 (1936).
" See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 at 912 (W. Va. 1978).
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An analysis of the court's decision in Mandolidis raises the
question of whether the construction given the words "deliberate
intention" reflects the legislative intent underlying that limitation
on employer immunity under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Mandolidis court observed that in early applications of the
deliberate intention language, the Supreme Court of Appeals
failed to articulate specifically the type of employer conduct sufficient to trigger the denial of immunity." The court first addressed
the question in 1933 while reviewing the sufficiency of a pleading
in Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co.3" The Mandolidis court properly noted that the Collins court, while holding the facts averred
to be sufficient to require the employer to defend on the merits,"
recognized that an employer could deliberately intend to cause
injury or death by an act of omission." Such a holding, however,
does not suggest that an act of omission will be sufficient to negate
the employer's statutory immunity unless done with a specific
intent to injure or kill.
One year later, in its second attempt to define the standard,
the court, in Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co.,3" stated that an
31Id. at 911-12.
- 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933). The Collins court reversed the judgment
of the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the theory of deliberate intent
to injure or kill. Id. at 236, 171 S.E. at 759.
" Id. at 235, 171 S.E. at 759.
I Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 911 (W. Va. 1978); Collins
v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 234-35, 171 S.E. 756, 759 (1933). The
Collins court stated:
We cannot see why the master cannot omit to perform a certain duty
imposed by law upon him with the deliberate intent by so doing to inflict
injury or death upon his employee. . . . [I]f the defendant. . . knew
full well that such conditions existed; then . . . we cannot see why the
very conditions alleged . . . might not have been permitted to continue
with the deliberate intent on the part of the employer, and with a design,
that their continuance should cause injury or death or both to its employees.
Id. (emphasis added). Although the court in Collins recognized that an employer
may deliberately intend to injure an employee through an omission, that court also
noted that the omission must be part of a design to injure or kill before an employee
may avail himself of the deliberate intention exception to the employer immunity
provision under W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
115 W. Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70 (1934). In dismissing the claim founded on the
deliberate intention theory, the Maynard court noted:
Gross negligence is not tantamount to "deliberate intention" to inflict injury. It may be that the carelessness, indifference and negligence
of an employer may be so wanton as to warrant a judicial determination
that his ulterior intent was to inflict injury. But in the very nature of
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employer loses his statutory immunity from suit if the reasonably

anticipated, natural and probable consequence of the employer's
conduct would be death or serious injury to the employee." In 1936,
41
however, the court, in Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co.,
announced that an employee seeking damages from his employer
for a work-related injury must show a specific intent on the part
of the employer to injure him in order to support a recovery. 2 Allen
is not inconsistent with either Collins or Maynard and, in fact,
would appear merely to represent a sharpening and focusing of the
court's earlier opinions. Although the Mandolidiscourt held Allen
to be inconsistent with Maynard and overruled the former, the
following language from Maynard indicates that Allen and
Maynard are not irreconcilable:
The degree of an employer's negligence in a given instance is not
determinative of the status of the employee's rights. The statute
does not provide, and cannot be interpreted to mean, that if the
employer is mildly negligent he shall be protected by the compensation act, but that if he is grossly negligent he shall not be
protected. Whether through further legislative refinement a differentiation can or should be made between the degrees of negligence of employers is a matter not relevant for judicial discussion. Our point is that under the existing statute, negligence
must be considered in its entirety and not gradationally. The
alleging of gross negligence does not change the status between
employee and employer, under the workmen's compensation
statute.
Gross negligence is not tantamount to "deliberate intention" to inflict injury.a
things, a showing which would warrant such finding would have to be
clear and forceful in high degree.
Id. at 253, 175 S.E. at 72.
@Id.
"1117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E. 612 (1936). The plaintiff in Allen was injured while
riding at the front of a trip of empty coal cars in defendant's mine when he was
struck by a wooden trapdoor hung across the tracks. Id. at 632-33, 186 S.E. at 61213.
" The Allen court set aside a judgment for the plaintiff and held that an
employee may not recover damages for personal injury from an employer protected
by workmen's compensation law absent a showing of the employer's specific intent
to injure him. Id. at 636-37, 186 S.E. at 614.
,P 115 W. Va. 249 at 252-53, 175 S.E. 70 at 72 (1934). This point is further
demonstrated by the fact that the court consistently adhered to the Allen construction of deliberate intention until Mandolidis. See Eisnaugle v. Booth, 226 S.E.2d
259, 261 (W. Va. 1976); Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc., 135 W. Va. 739,
748-50, 65 S.E.2d 87, 93-94 (1951).
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The Mandolidis court expressly overruled Allen's specific intent requirement." The court concluded from the language used in
5
Collins and Maynard"
that both earlier decisions had rejected, as
a prerequisite to a common law recovery, the requirement that the
employee prove his employer's specific intent to injure him.'" In
the face of the forty-two year life span of the specific intent construction and the legislative history behind the statute, the
Mandolidis court redefined the limit on employer statutory immunity from suit.'7 The court declared that the Allen construction
worked an injustice on employees because it deprived them of
claims against employers who carried on their enterprises with a
knowing and calculated disregard for human safety." The court,
therefore, announced that if injury results from an intentional tort
or wilful, wanton, and reckless misconduct, a jury should be permitted to find that the employer deliberately intended the injury

within the meaning of the Act.'
In general, a court's purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent underlying the statute.1 Furthermore, when a legislature adopts a statute from another jurisdiction, the construction given the statute by that jurisdiction usually will govern. As part of its first workmen's compensation act, Washington originated a provision granting employers
limited immunity from common law actions by employees for
work-related injuries.52 West Virginia, Kentucky, Maryland, and
" Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 909, 913 (W. Va. 1978).
4 See notes 38-39 supra.
1 Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 at 912-13 (W. Va. 1978).
The court noted that the Collins court had declined to interpret Article 4, section
2 of the Act as requiring a showing that the employer acted with a specific intent
to injure the employee-plaintiff although defendant's counsel had argued for such
a construction. See Brief for the Defendant in Error at 17-18, Collins v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933).
,7See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 at 913-14 (W. Va.
1978); see text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
Id. at 913.
" Id. at 913-14.
Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 684, 76 S.E.2d 885, 898 (1953); Richardson v.
Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 137 W. Va. 819, 824, 74 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1953).
11 Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 636, 186 S.E. 612,
614 (1936); Rose v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 75 W. Va. 1, 4, 83 S.E. 85, 86-87 (1914);
see Nimick & Co. v. Mingo Iron Works Co., 25 W. Va. 184, 192 (1884).
" WASH. REv. Cona ANN. § 51.24.020 (1962); see Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming
Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 633, 186 S.E. 612, 613 (1936). For a brief treatment of
the origins and growth of workmen's compensation law in the United States, see 1
A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WoRKmna
's COMPENSATION §§ 5.20-.30 (1978).
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Oregon later enacted similar compensation statutes and adoped
almost verbatim the limited employer immunity provision. 3 Since
those enactments, all jurisdictions which have addressed the question have construed the immunity provision as requiring a specific
intent to injure before the employer is exposed to common law
liability. 4 As noted above, West Virginia adopted such a construction in Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co.5" and applied it consistently thereafter. The West Virginia Legislature re-enacted the
limited immunity provision without change subsequent to the
court's construction in Allen and indicated through its acquiescence that the court had properly construed the provision. 6 More
compelling evidence of the legislature's adoption of the Allen construction of "deliberate intention" is the refusal by the legislature
to pass any of the eleven bills proposed since 1969 which would
have altered the deliberate intent requirement. 5 State representatives introduced bills to amend the deliberate intention standard
to require only a showing of wilful, wanton, and reckless misconduct,58 or gross negligence," and to create a rebuttable presump0

W. VA. CODE

§ 23-4-2 (1978 Replacement Vol.); Ky.

REV. STAT.

§ 342.610

(1972); MD. ANN. CODE Art. 101 § 44 (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.156(2) (1973).
See Brief as Amicus Curiae of the West Virginia Farm Bureau et al. at 12-13,
Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
" E.g., McCray v. Davis H. Elliott Co., 419 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1967); Fryman
v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 277 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1955); Jenkins v. Carmen
Mfg. Co., 79 Or. 448, 155 P. 703 (1916); Delthony v. Standard Furniture Co., 119
Wash. 298, 205 P. 379 (1922); Eisnaugle v. Booth, 226 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1976);
Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc., 135 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E.2d 87 (1951);
Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E. 612 (1936). See
2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.13 (1976 & Cum. Supp.
1978).
1 117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E. 612 (1936). See
text accompanying notes 41-43
supra.

51Article 4, section 2, of the Act was amended and reenacted by the legislature
without altering the "deliberate intention" provision in Act of Mar. 7, 1945, ch. 131,
art. 4, § 2, 1945 W. Va. Acts 476, 495. The Supreme Court of Appeals has held that
if the legislature reenacts a statute without change subsequent to construction of
the statute, the court will deem the legislature to have adopted that construction.
State v. Muntzing, 146 W. Va. 349, 358, 120 S.E.2d 260, 265 (1961); Parsons v.
Roane County Court, 92 W. Va. 490, 496-97, 115 S.E. 473, 476 (1922); see 2A A.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.09 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973).
0 See Brief on behalf of Eastern Assoc'd Coal Corp., Appellee, at 25-26, Appendix i-iv, Dishmon v. Eastern Assoc'd Coal Corp., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
' Several bills introduced into the Senate and House would have exposed
employers to common law liability upon a showing of wilful, wanton, or reckless
conduct or gross negligence by the employer or upon a violation by the employer of
a statute or duly promulgated rule or regulation. Enr. S.B. 7, Reg. Sess. (1970) (by
Mr. Kinsolving); Enr. H.B. 545, Reg. Sess. (1970) (by Mr. Zakaib); and Enr. S.B.
30, Reg. Sess. (1969) (by Mr. Kinsolving).
11A bill introduced into the House on March 9, 1977, would have permitted
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tion of deliberate intention where employer conduct violates a
safety standard,"° among other proposed changes." The legislature
refused to adopt any of the bills, thereby reaffirming approval of
the Allen construction." Yet, the court, in one sweeping opinion,
brought about a change in the law that numerous legislators have
tried, without success, to effect for nearly ten years.
As noted previously, the Mandolidis court relied heavily upon

Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co.13 for the proposition that prior

courts had rejected the specific intent requirement. The specific
intent requirement, however, was not at issue in Collins. In that
decision the court held only that deliberate intention may be demonstrated by acts of omission. 4 The focus of the Collins court was
upon the employer's accompanying intent, not upon the omission.65 The employer in Collins ordered plaintiff's decedent to work
under an earth bank which had caved in on several occasions. The
employer's foreman allegedly knew that the bank was about to
cave in again when he ordered the decedent to begin working
beneath it. Shortly after the decedent moved beneath the overemployee suits against employers for injuries resulting from employer negligence.
Enr. H.B. 1522, Reg. Sess. (1977) (by Mr. Yanni). See also note 58 supra.
10A variety of bills introduced into the House and Senate would have estab.
lished a presumption of deliberate intention to injure against the employer upon
the showing that an employee's injury or death was proximately caused by an
employer's violation of a safety statute or regulation. Enr. S.B. 403, Reg. Sess.
(1976) (by Mr. Davis and Mr. Huffman); Enr. H.B. 1159, Reg. Sess. (1976) (by Mr.
Burleson and Mr. Albright); Enr. S.B. 435, Reg. Sess. (1975) (by Mr. Davis and
Mr. McGraw); Enr. H.B. 1189, Reg. Sess. (1975) (by Mr. Dinsmore and Mr. Albright); Enr. S.B. 510, Reg. Sess. (1974) (by Mr. McGraw); Enr. H.B. 1330, Reg.
Sess. (1974) (by Mr. Stacey); Enr. S.B. 487, Reg. Sess. (1974) (by Mr. Ward and
Mr. Moreland); Enr. H.B. 1215, Reg. Sess. (1974) (by Mr. Dinsmore and Mr.
Jones); Enr. S.B. 424, Reg. Sess. (1974) (by Mr. Palumbo); Enr. H.B. 1096, Reg.
Sess. (1974) (by Mr. Sommerville); Enr. S.B. 396, Reg. Sess. (1973) (by Mr.
McGraw and Mr. Poffenbarger); Enr. H.B. 1157, Reg. Sess. (1973) (by Mr. Moore
and Mr. Dinsmore); Enr. S.B. 1037, Reg. Sess. (1973) (by Mr. Sommerville and Mr.
Kopelman); Enr. H.B. 213, Reg. Sess. (1973) (by Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Poffenbarger).
&ITwo bills introduced in 1972 would have steamlined the provisions of
W. VA. CODE §§ 23-2-6 and 23-4-2 but would have made no substantive change in
those statutes. Enr. H.B. 1152, Reg. Sess. (1972) (by Mr. Seibert); Enr. S.B. 353,
Reg. Seass. (1972) (by Mr. Hubbard).
62 See note 56 supra.
n 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933).
" See note 38 supra.

0 114 W. Va. at 234-35, 171 S.E. at 759.
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hanging bank, it collapsed and entombed him.6 Before remanding
the case for trial on the merits, the court observed that if an employee can establish that his employer knowingly permitted conditions to exist which "would naturally result in injury or death...
[and that the employer permitted those conditions to continue]
with a design . . . that their continuance should cause injury or
death or both to its employees" 7 then the employee will have
brought his claim within the deliberate intention exception to the
employer immunity provision. 8
The court faced a different factual situation in Maynard v.
Island Creek Coal Co." Plaintiff's decedent in Maynard stumbled
on a bolt, fell through a defective covering onto a conveyor below,
and was killed." The court held that the plaintiffs claim did not
meet the prerequisites of the deliberate intention exception because the result of the decedent's stumbling "was characterized by
fortuitousness rather than by anticipated sequence."' Although
the defective conveyor covering exposed workers to some degree of
danger, the natural and probable consequence of that continuing
defect was not serious injury or death to an employee. In drawing
the distinction, the Maynard court pointed out that the employer
in Collins knew when he directed his employee to work under the
earth bank that the employee would be killed or seriously injured.
The employer in Maynard, however, could not be charged with the
same knowledge, despite the existence of the defective covering. In
other words, the employer did not act with a deliberate intention
to injure or kill the employee. Because the employer had not refrained from repairing the conveyor covering with a design to injure
the decedent, he was entitled to statutory immunity. 72
The court in Mandolidis stated, nonetheless, that if an employee shows that his injury resulted from his employer's knowing
failure to observe safety laws and regulations, then the employee
will have produced evidence of employer conduct pursued with a
knowledge and appreciation of the attendant risk of harm. 3 The
court defined such conduct as wilful, wanton, and reckless and
" Id, at 231, 171 S.E. at 757.
Id. at 234-35, 171 S.E. at 759 (emphasis added).

"Id.
"

115 W. Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70 (1934).

7'See note 39 supra.

,115 W. Va. at 253, 175 S.E. at 72 (emphasis added).
Id.; see note 76 infra.
"Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d at 914 n.10 (W. Va. 1978).
'
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sufficient to eliminate the employer's statutory immunity.7 This
position, which espouses a constructive intent to injure," fails to
distinguish between a negligent and an intentional violation of a

safety statute; in other words, it does not distinguish an instance
of negligence from a calculated course of conduct purposely pursued by the employer despite a clear risk of serious injury to employees." The Mandolidis court sought to eliminate the requirement that an employee seeking damages from his employer establish that the employer acted with a specific intent to injure the
employee-that the employer determined to injure or kill the
employee and acted either by commission or omission to accomplish that purpose. The court apparently intended to extend common law liability beyond employers who commit intentional torts
to those who carry on their businesses with a reckless disregard for
the safety of their workers.7
The broad language employed by the majority, however,
seems to sweep beyond this specific, policy goal. By announcing
that an employer violation of a safety statute is competent evidence to establish the employer's knowledge of the risk of harm
created thereby, and that conduct pursued with such knowledge
may be deemed wilful, wanton, and reckless,78 the Mandolidis
court came close to imposing strict liability on employers for injuries resulting from such violations.
11Id. at 914.
7 Id. at 921 (Neely, J., dissenting).
7' Every jurisdiction that has considered the question has held that violation
of a safety statute, by itself, does not constitute a deliberately intended injury for
purposes of workmen's compensation law. E.g., Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc.,
246 S.E.2d 907, 921 (W. Va. 1978) (Neely, J., dissenting); North v. United States
Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1974); Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc., 6
Ariz. App. 12, 429 P.2d 504 (1967); Hagger v. Wartz Biscuit Co., 210 Ark. 318, 196
S.W.2d 1 (1946); Law v. Dartt, 109 Cal. App. 2d 508, 240 P.2d 1013 (1952); Southern
Wire and Iron Co. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962); Duncan v. Perry
Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946); Kenner v. Hanreco, 161 So. 2d 142
(La. App. 1964); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Reyes, 75 Nev. 212, 337 P.2d 624
(1959); Wilkinson v. Achber, 101 N.H. 7, 131 A.2d 51 (1957); Bryan v. Jeffers, 103
N.J. Super. 522, 248 A.2d 129 (1968); Finch v. Swingly, 42 App. Div. 2d 1035, 348
N.Y.S. 2d 266 (1973); Ross v. State, 8 App. Div. 2d 902, 187 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1959);
Roberts v. Barclay, 369 P.2d 808 (Okla. 1962); Heikkila v. Ewen Transfer Co., 135
Or. 631, 297 P. 373 (1931); Evans v. Allentown Portland Cement Co., 433 Pa. 595,
252 A.2d 646 (1969); Castleberry v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 268 S.W. 771 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925); Steele v. Eaton, 130 Vt. 1, 285 A.2d 749 (1971); Winterroth v.
Meats, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 7, 516 P.2d 522.(1973). See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF
WORKMEn's COMPENSATION § 68.13 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
n Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (W. Va. 1978).
" Id. at 914.
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Justice Neely's dissent may have helped to clarify the perimeters of the court's holding. He stated that trial courts should follow
the distinction recognized in Collins and Maynard between negligent acts which cause injury and deliberate acts either designed to
injure or performed with reckless disregard for employee safety. 9
Justice Neely identified the issue of statutory immunity as a question of law in the first instance and directed trial courts to dismiss
a plaintiff's case at the close of his evidence absent a clear showing
of deliberate intention to injure or kill or a wilful, wanton, and
reckless disregard for human life."0
Justice Miller, in a concurring opinion written in response to
Justice Neely's dissent, scolds Justice Neely for "his theoretical
fears of increased nuisance suits."'" Justice Miller is careful to
point out, however, that all the Mandolidis court has done is to
hold "that these two cases [Dishmon and Snodgrass] are entitled
to further development through discovery before the issue of deliberate intention can be determined under the guidelines of our opinion.""2 If Justice Miller's concurring opinion reflects the view of the
majority, it does much to clarify and soften the impact of
Mandolidis. Justice Miller clearly indicates that the burden of
proving deliberate intent remains a difficult obstacle to overcome
and that summary judgment or a directed verdict are still available to the employer after the case has been properly developed.
Only by relegating the question of requisite intent to the trial
judge may courts preserve the distinction between negligence and
deliberate intention and safeguard, in any meaningful sense, the
legislative intent underlying the statutory grant of employer immunity from suit." It may be that the only significance of
T' Id. at 922-23 (Neely, J., dissenting).
Id. at 923.

Id. at 926 (Miller, J. concurring).
Id. at 927 (Miller, J. concurring).
'3Because the legislature never intended to hold employers strictly liable to
employees for violations of safety statutes which result in injury, a trial court should
dismiss claims by employees which demonstrate only a violation. A comparison of
the factual situations in Mandolidis and Snodgrass indicates the need for trial
courts to distinguish between employer negligence which causes injury and a course
of conduct pursued by employers with reckless disregard for the safety and lives of
their workers. The plaintiffs in Mandolidisalleged that the employer knew of the
serious danger imposed on the workers through the employer's insistence that those
workers operate saws and similar machinery without prescribed safety equipment.
The plaintiffs further alleged that despite several serious injuries caused by the
dangerous equipment and contrary to direct orders by federal safety inspectors, the
employer ordered his employees to work with the machinery. See text accompany"
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Mandolidis is the court's determination that the cases were not
sufficiently developed to permit a summary judgment or a dismissal. If so, it is difficult to quarrel with the decision. The language of the majority opinion suggests, however, that the question
of employer immunity will often be submitted to the jury under
the guidelines established by the court, thus effectively amending
the immunity statute and raising the spectre of massive employer
liability, despite the absence of deliberate intention to injure or
kill. Such a construction is not apparent from the Act itself, from
the legislative history, or from the consistent application of the Act
by the court in every decision prior to Mandolidis. As suggested by
Justice Neely:
This is one area of the law in which the threshold issue concerning statutory immunity is in no regard a "jury question." Minute supervision by the trial judge is mandated in all cases because the exception to the blanket workmen's compensation
immunity which would permit a plaintiff to submit his case to
a jury is so narrow, and the construction of what does or does
not constitute a case within the exception is so technical, that
trial judges should ruthlessly decide the issue as a matter of law
in the first instance.u
B.

Occupational Pneumoconiosis

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, occupational pneumoconiosis is treated and compensated in the same fashion as a
compensable injury.s Unlike claims for work-related injuries, however, claims for occupational pneumoconiosis are developed
through a bifurcated proceeding in which issues relating to dust
exposure in the workplace environment are considered separately
ing note 21 supra. The allegations, if true, might demonstrate a course of conduct
pursued by the employer in conscious disregard of employee safety.
Plaintiffs in Snodgrass, however, alleged no comparable course of conduct
pursued by the employer which might demonstrate that the conduct was not only
negligent but also deliberately intended. Plaintiffs' allegations in Snodgrass, if
taken as true, warrant at most a finding of gross negligence, conduct insufficient
to expose the employer to common law liability.
Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 923-24 (W. Va. 1978)

(dissenting).
See W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-1, -6a (1978 Replacement Vol. & Cum. Supp.
respectively). In occupational pneumoconiosis claims the date of injury shall be the
date of last exposure to the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis. W. VA. Con
§ 23-4-14 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
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from medical issues. 6 Similarly, the cases considered by the court
can be classified as either exposure or medical.
1. Exposure Considerations
Presently, the threshold exposure issue in a claim filed for
occupational pneumoconiosis is whether:
the employee has been exposed to the hazards of occupational
pneumoconiosis in the State of West Virginia over a continuous
period of not less than two years during the ten years immediately preceding the date of his last exposure to such hazards,
or for any five of the fifteen
years immediately preceding the
87
date of such last exposure.

While occupational pneumoconiosis is defined by statute to be
"a disease of the lungs caused by the inhalation of minute particles
of dust over a period of time due to causes and conditions arising
out of and in the course of the employment,"" the statute provides
no guidance as to what constitutes the "hazards of occupational
pneumoconiosis" .or "a continuous period of not less than two
years." Thus, these terms must be defined on the basis of case law
or go undefined.
In the case of Meadows v. Workmen's Compensation
8 the Supreme Court of Appeals considered the
Commissioner,"
question of what constitutes a hazard of occupational pneumoconiosis and concluded that "a 'hazard', as contemplated by the statute, consists of any condition where it can be demonstrated that
there are minute particles of dust in abnormal quantities in the
work area."' 0 The Meadows court, however, stopped short of providing any insight into what constitutes "abnormal quantities" of
dust except to note that abnormal quantities of dust can exist even
u Generally, medical issues involve a determination of the extent to which an
employee may be suffering from the disease of occupational pneumoconiosis.
W. VA. Con § 23-4-8c (Cum. Supp. 1978).
" W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.); It should be noted that this
section was amended effective July 1, 1976, to add language recognizing exposure
during five of the fifteen years immediately preceding the date of last exposure as
an acceptable basis for recovery. Prior to July 1, 1976, the threshold issue was
whether "the employee has been exposed to the hazards of occupational pneumo.
coniosis in the State of West Virginia over a continuous period of not less than two
years during the ten years immediately preceding the date of his last exposure to
such hazards."
'Id.

198 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1973).
"Id. at 139.
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though such quantities are "less than would be customary in many
other industries such as coal mining."91
Since early 1977, the present court has been afforded several
opportunities to address the issue of "abnormal quantities"; however, it has consistently chosen not to rule on this issue. In Lewis
v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,2 the employer presented the court with an opportunity to define "abnormal quantities" as "harmful quantities." The case dealt with an industrial
workplace from which the employer had attempted to introduce
results of atmospheric tests showing that the level of dust particles
in the air was less than one-fifth of the established "threshold limit
value" or harmful level for the particular dusts involved."3 The
Commissioner had disallowed the introduction of this evidence
because the employer's expert performed the tests subsequent to
the time period in issue, although the record indicated that conditions in the workplace had remained substantially unchanged.
Thus, the court was presented with a case in which "hazard" could
be defined in terms of an objective standard employing scientific
measurement. Nevertheless, it elected to deny review. 4
95
In Schlaegel v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,
a
case similar to Lewis, the employer asked the court to review the
Appeal Board's refusal to reject an application for benefits on the
ground that the employee had not been exposed to the hazards of
occupational pneumoconiosis as required by law. The employee
spent approximately seventy-five percent of his work time from
1953 to 1969 and approximately ninety percent of his work time
from 1969 until March 7, 1974, the date he filed his application for
benefits, in a shop which contained no internal dust source. The
"1

Id. at 140.

12 No.

10052 (appeal denied March 15, 1977). The factual summary which
follows in the text is taken from Appellant's Petition for Appeal and Note of Argument.
11The threshold limit value relied on was a standard for respirable or nuisance
dust testified to by the employer's expert witness. The standard used was the same
threshold limit value as that promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). See note 96 infra.
1
,While the admissibility of results from atmospheric tests was not addressed
by the court in this case, other courts have recognized the efficacy of such test
results. See, e.g., Kernaghan v. Sunshine Mining Co., 73 Idaho 106, 245 P.2d 806
(1952); Payne v. Workmen's Comp. Dir., 149 W. Va. 316, 140 S.E.2d 793 (1965).
15No. 10213 (appeal denied March 22, 1977). The factual summary which
follows in the text is taken from Appellant's Petition for Appeal and Note of Argument.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss1/2

18

Flannery et al.: The Expanding Role of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
COMPENSATION APPEALS
only source of dust alleged by the employee to have affected the
air in the shop was from an outside operation. That dust was
present only during the summer months when: the shop doors were
open, it was not raining, the outside source was in operation, and
the wind was blowing from the outside source toward the shop.
Even then the employee indicated that upon detection of dust
entering the shop, the door would be closed promptly. The employer succeeded in introducing into the record the results of tests
showing that the level of dust particles in the air in the shop was
approximately one-fifth of established threshold limit (or harmful)
values." The Supreme Court of Appeals again denied review.
Thus, even though the term "abnormal quantities" is at the
heart of the threshold issue in an occupational pneumoconiosis
claim, no definition of that term has yet been established by the
court. Instead, the pattern of the court's review suggests that virtually any amount of dust in the work environment will be deemed
sufficient exposure, thus rendering the statute's use of the term
"hazard" meaningless.
The leading case in West Virginia bearing upon the definition
of "a continuous period of not less than two years" is Richardson
v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,7 which was decided
by the Supreme Court of Appeals in 1953. In that case, the court
stated:
The phrase "continuous period" or word "continuous" as used
in the statutory provisions, means reasonable continuity, when
related to conditions surrounding the employee's exposure to
the hazard of the disease silicosis. To give the phrase or word a
, The threshold limit values relied upon by the employer were the standards
for exposure to inert or nuisance dusts promulgated by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) of the United States Department of Labor pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678
(1970). Those standards appear in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000, Table Z-3 (1977). Although the court denied review in Lewis and Schlaegel, it has sanctioned the use
of similar standards in a hearing loss case. Myers v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r,
239 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1977). In Myers, the court took judicial notice of noise
standards promulgated under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
as amended. 30 U.S.C.A. § 801-961 (Supp. 1978). The court then observed that the
record did not show the claimant's actual noise exposure. Justice McGraw, writing
for the court, took notice of a publication showing average noise levels in claimant's
job and noted that the average exceeded the federal standard. Since the employer
did not give evidence of the actual noise level, the court found that "It]he natural
inference, arising from all the circumstances, is that the documentary evidence
available to the employer was unfavorable." Id. at 127.
11137 W. Va. 819, 74 S.E.2d 258 (1953).
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literal meaning and require an uninterrupted period of 2 years
in one instance and an interrupted [sic] period of 60 days in
the other, whichever the case may be, would require that before
an employee could be eligible for compensation benefits an account of silicosis, that he should have worked on Sundays, holidays, during periods of temporary illness and work stoppages,
beyond the employee's control. If such interruptions occurred,
the continuity of the exposure to the hazard of silicon dioxide
dust would be interrupted. Nevertheless, such interruption, as
in the instant case, may not prevent the onslaught of the disease
silicosis.11
While the court clearly pointed out in Richardson that
"continuous" exposure need not occur over consecutive days, the
meaning of the term "continuous" has been significantly broadened by the present court in Jarrell v. Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner." In Jarrell, the claimant worked in West Virginia
from 1935 to 1953 during which time he primarily operated a conveyor inside a coal mine and worked on a coal tipple. The claimant
stopped working in the mines from 1953 until December 10, 1971,
when he took a job as a "dust technician." From 1953 to 1971,
claimant suffered no exposure to the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis. As a dust technician, the claimant worked mainly in
an office near a mine. About once a week, the claimant entered
the mine and remained there for approximately five hours. During
the first two or three months of his employment in this capacity,
the claimant went underground daily. The claimant filed his application for occupational pneumoconiosis benefits on June 19, 1974.
The employer challenged claimant's application for benefits and
argued that claimant had not been exposed continuously to the
hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis for a period of two years
during the ten years immediately preceding the filing of his claim.
While conceding that his exposure was limited to once per week,
the claimant relied upon Richardson and contended that his exposure had been reasonably continuous.
In its per curiam opinion, the court held:
[T~he evidence, when construed in accordance with the principal [sic] enunciated by this Court in the case of Richardson v.
State Compensation Commissioner, 137 W. Va. 819, 74 S.E.2d
Id. at 826, 74 S.E.2d at 262.
No. 13968 (per curiam Nov. 22, 1977). The factual summary which follows
in the text is taken from Appellant's Petition for Appeal and Note of Argument.
"
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258 (1953), indicates that the claimant was exposed to the
hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis over a continuous period of not less than two years during the ten years immediately
preceding the date of his last exposure to such hazards. .... 1.
"I Jarrell v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, No. 13968, slip op. at 4 (W. Va. Nov.
22, 1977). While not at issue in Jarrell,the Richardson decision suggests that even.
though continuity of exposure is not interrupted by absences beyond the claimant's
control, the claimant must nevertheless have actual exposure to the hazards of
occupational pneumoconiosis for the statutorily prescribed time periods.
In Richardson, the claimant was employed in a mine from June 10, 1943 to
September 8, 1948, more than five yearg. He worked underground off and on for
approximately two more years for a total of seven years in the ten year period. No
question was raised as to the two year continuous exposure requirement, and claimant apparently had a significant amount of exposure within the ten year period.
The principal question considered in Richardson was whether claimant-had
filed his claim within two years (now three years) from and after his last continuous
period of sixty days exposure to the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis. The
court found that claimant was actually employed in the mine from June 3, 1949,
through July 27, 1949, during which time he actually worked for a total of nineteen
days, and from August, 1949; through March 18, 1950, during which time he actually worked fifty-five days. Therefore, the total time of actual exposure in the
mine was seventy-four days, apparently broken up by periods of illness, work stoppages, and, of course, weekends and holidays, all matters beyond claimant's control. The claimant filed his application for benefits on July 27, 1951.
In construing the requirement of sixty continuous days, the court indicated
that the word "continuous" in the statute does not mean "consecutive" but rather
means "reasonable continuity." Having defined the term "continuous" in this manner, the court then examined the facts of the case to see whether the claimant's
actual exposure occurred for the requisite time period.
Clearly, the court in Richardson calculated the number of days that the claimant was actually exposed in the only reasonably continuous period of exposure
within the statutory time period. Because claimant had seventy-four days of such
actual exposure broken up only by matters beyond his control, the court held that
he had satisfied the statutory filing requirement. It seems clear that the result
would have been different had claimant's total actual exposure been less than sixty
days.
Accepting the court's indication that its construction of continuous would also
apply in the construction of the requirement of two continuous years exposure in
the ten years immediately preceding the date of last exposure, it also seems clear
from Richardson that the court would have required 730 days or two years of actual
exposure had that been the. issue. Although the court holds that periods of illness,
strike, etc., do noi break up an otherwise continuous exposure period, neither are
such periods considered part of the six month or two year exposures necessary to
satisfy the statute. Were the court's decision to be interpreted otherwise, a workman could be held to have two continuous years of exposure in a situation where
he worked one day, was off with an illness for 728 days, and then worked one further
day. That is, two days' exposure interrupted by 728 days of absence would be
deemed exposure for two continuous years. Richardson v. State Comp. Comm'r, 137
W. Va. 819, 74 S.E.2d 258 (1953). While the Richardson decision seems clearly to

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1978

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 2

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

The foregoing language from Jarrellevidences a questionable
reading of the Richardson opinion. Richardson only holds that
periods when a claimant is not working due to matters wholly
beyond his control will not be held to disrupt the continuity of
exposure. The Richardson court in no way suggested that an individual who is not exposed on each day he actually works can be
said to have been continuously exposed.
2.

Medical Considerations

At the medical stage of the development of an occupational
pneumoconiosis claim, the threshold issue is as follows:
[whether] employees have been exposed to the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis or other occupational disease and in
this State have contracted occupational pneumoconiosis or
other occupational disease, or have suffered a perceptible aggravation of an existing pneumoconiosis or other occupational disease . .

0.

This language was interpreted in 1962 by the Supreme Court of
Appeals in Turner v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner'",
and Garges v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner."' In
Turner and Garges, the court held that an employer cannot be
charged with an award for silicosiso4 or other occupational disease
unless the claimant demonstrates that the disease was actually
require two years of actual exposure, although that two years may be acquired over
a longer period due to temporary interruptions beyond the employee's control,
Jarrellimplies that any exposure resulting from employment over a two year period
may be sufficient. The court, however, may not have been squarely presented with
this issue in Jarrell.
o W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
" 147 W. Va. 1, 123 S.E.2d 880, aff'd on rehearing, 147 W. Va. 145, 126 S.E.2d
379 (1962).
11 147 W. Va. 11, 123 S.E.2d 886, aff'd on rehearing,147 W. Va. 188, 126 S.E.2d
193 (1962).
' Prior to July 1, 1969, the Act extended coverage to "silicosis and any other
occupational disease. . . ." Act of Mar. 10, 1967, ch. 203, 1967 W. Va. Acts 1223,
1224. The silicosis law contained hazardous exposure requirements similar to the
present day occupational pneumoconiosis requirements. Specifically, hazardous
exposure was defined as "the exposure of an employee in the course of his employment to a working condition in which the air contains such a concentration of silicon
dioxide dust that the breathing of such air by a person over a long period of time
would be likely to cause him to contract the disease of silicosis." Id. Article 4,
section 1 of the Act was amended effective July 1, 1969, to substitute the term
"occupational pneumoconiosis" for "silicosis". Act of Mar. 8, 1969, ch. 152, 1969
W. Va. Acts 1267, 1270. The definition of hazardous exposure was deleted.
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contracted or perceptibly aggravated while he was working for the
employer whose account is charged.
The present court, however, reconsidered this question in
'0 5
Maynard v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and
announced important new rules governing the liability of successive employers of a claimant seeking occupational pneumoconiosis
benefits." 6 The court in Maynard overruled Turner and Garges and
held that an employee who has worked for multiple employers in
West Virginia, and has contracted occupational pneumoconiosis,
need not prove to what extent each employer contributed to the
disease as a prerequisite to compensation.0 7 Instead, the court
directed the Commissioner to hold the employers jointly liable for
the compensation charges.'" The further importance of this decision arises from the court's instruction that the Commissioner
apportion the charges in accordance with the employee's total period of employment with each employer and the relative hazards
present in each work environment.' 9
In Maynard, United States Steel Corporation had taken over
operations at a mine formerly run by Crystal Block Coal Company."' As part of the changeover, United States Steel instituted
a very effective dust abatement program which significantly reduced dust concentrations."' The claimant in Maynard had
worked for Crystal Block for fourteen years and had contracted
occupational pneumoconiosis before the take-over by United
States Steel." After working two and one-half years for United
States Steel, the claimant filed an application for benefits."' The
Commissioner granted an award but charged United States Steel
with more than eighty-five percent of those benefits."4 In reversing
the apportionment, the court directed the Commissioner to consider the period of time that the claimant had worked with each
employer and the working conditions throughout each employ'

239 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1977).

The pertinent language of W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
has not changed materially from the date of the Turner and Garges cases to the
present.
"0'

"0

239 S.E.2d at 508.

10 Id.

I Id. at 508-09.
110Id. at 505, 509.
"' Id. at 509.

Id. at 505.

12,

113Id.

114Id.
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ment. ' 15 In response, the Commissioner reduced the assessment
against United States Steel to less than fifteen percent of the total
award. Although the court, to some extent, expanded employer
liability in Maynard, it also offered employers reduced compensation charges as an incentive to reduce industrial health hazards."'
Here, the court's decision gives effect to clear statutory language
which had consistently been ignored by the Commissioner and the
Appeal Board.
Pursuant to the holding in Maynard, an employee who has
filed a timely application is now entitled to compensation if (a) he
has been exposed to the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis
for the requisite statutory period, and (b) either he has contracted
occupational pneumoconiosis in this state or has suffered a perceptible aggravation of the disease. If the employee meets both criteria, then all of his employers who exposed him to the hazards of
occupational pneumoconiosis are chargeable for compensation
payments, provided that they employed him for at least sixty days
during the three years prior to his date of last exposure."' Once the
chargeable employers are ascertained, however, the total employment history with each employer is considered and not just the
employment history within the three year period."'
Id. at 508-09.
Id. at 509.
" W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.), provides, in part: "[Tihe
"
"

commissioner may allocate to and divide any charges resulting from such claim
among the employers by whom the claimant was employed for as much as sixty
days during the period of three years immediately preceding the date of last exposure to the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis."
I' Prior to Maynard, allocations were made among multiple employers based
solely on the relative time of exposure with each employer during the three year
period immediately preceding the date of last exposure. The inequity of this ap.
proach is illustrated by the following example: Employer A employs claimant for
twenty years ending on December 31, 1975. Employer B employs claimant for two
years, from January 1, 1976, through December 31, 1977. Claimant files his claim
on December 31, 1977. Prior to Maynard, the allocation would have been 66 2/3
percent to Employer B who had only two years of exposure and 33 1/3 percent to
Employer A who had twenty years of exposure, but only one year in the applicable
three year period. As a result of Maynard, the allocation in the same case, assuming
the same degree of exposure with each employer, would be approximately 90.9
percent to Employer A and 9.1 percent to Employer B, clearly a more equitable
allocation. In addition, the Commissioner must now consider the relative degree of
exposure with each employer. See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra. The allocation based on degree of exposure is bound to be somewhat arbitrary and is sure
to cause problems for the Commissioner. Nevertheless, the court's ruling in
Maynard is clearly in line with the statute. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
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C.

Limitations on Filing Claims

In Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,"'
the court was presented with the question of whether an occupational pneumoconiosis claim filed after the period of limitation in
effect on the claimant's date of last exposure 2 ' was rendered timely
by a legislative extension of the limitation period which became
effective before the original limitation period had expired. 2' The
court observed that there are two conflicting principles involved in
deciding this issue in the context of workmen's compensation law.
The first is the generally recognized principle that the statute in
effect at the date of injury is controlling.'22 The second is the principle that new statutes dealing only with procedural matters apply
both to already accrued and to future actions.1
242 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1978).
Act of Mar. 8, 1969, ch. 152, 1969 W. Va. Acts 1267, 1293, in effect on March
13, 1970, the claimant's date of last exposure to the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis, provided that all applications for occupational pneumoconiosis benefits
"'
',

"must be.

.

. filed.

. .

within three years from and after the last day of the last

continuous period of sixty days or more during which the employee was exposed to
the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis. .... "
"I On July 1, 1970, and again on July 1, 1971, Act of Mar. 13, 1971, ch. 177,
1971 W. Va. Acts 969, was amended to add an alternative limitation period. The
court, in Lester, observed that the legislature eliminated "all time limitations on
filing with the exception that a claim must be filed within three years from and
after the employee's occupational pneumoconiosis was made known to him by a
physician or which he should reasonably have known, whichever shall last occur."
242 S.E.2d at 444-45. The legislature, however, did not eliminate the existing limitation provision, but merely added the language referred to by the court as an
alternative limitation on filing.
In 242 S.E.2d at 451. Ball v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 156 W. Va. 419, 194
S.E.2d 229 (1973); Lancaster v. State Comp. Comm'r, 125 W. Va. 190, 23 S.E.2d
601 (1942). Both Ball and Lancaster,although announcing a general rule, dealt with
the effect of subsequent legislation on the size of the award. The court, in Lancaster,
cited the Indiana decision of Riggs v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 76 Ind. App.
308, 131 N.E. 231 (1921), for the proposition that allowing subsequent legislation
to affect the size of a compensation award would be to destroy vested rights. 125
W. Va. at 193, 23 S.E.2d at 603.
1" 242 S.E.2d at 446. Consentina v. State Comp. Comm'r, 127 W. Va. 67, 31
S.E.2d 499 (1944); Proffitt v. State Comp. Comm'r, 108 W. Va. 438, 151 S.E. 307
(1930); Tackett v. Ott, 108 W. Va. 402, 151 S.E. 310 (1930); McShan v. Heaberlin,
105 W. Va. 447, 143 S.E. 109 (1928). In Consentina,the statute involved dealt with
the authority of the Commissioner to grant further awards to individuals injured
prior to March 7, 1929. The court observed that the statute was more than a statute
of limitations in that it acted against a public officer, the Commissioner, to prohibit
him from acting. 127 W. Va. at 74-75, 31 S.E.2d at 503. The language of the court's
decision, however, does not suggest that the decision would have been different had
the statute been purely one of limitation.
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The court referred to a line of cases from other jurisdictions
which have held that statutes of limitation "are merely procedural
and remedial in nature and are applicable to claims not barred
under the original limitation period at the effective date of the
statute enlarging the limitation period."'2 4 The court then-adopted
the "majority view."' '
Having concluded that the better view is that statutes of limitation in the workmen's compensation context should apply to all
claims not previously barred when the statute is enacted, the court
considered the question of whether such a construction can be
constitutionally applied. The court noted two constitutional issues: (1) whether such a construction "unconstitutionally impairs
the obligation of the contract;' ' 2 and (2) whether an employer has
a vested right in the statute of limitations which is in effect on the
date of the employee's injury.2'
In regard to the former issue, the court rendered a rather
sweeping rejection of the contract theory of workmen's compensation law. The decision dealt at length with the origin of voluntary
workmen's compensation statutes and the gradual evolution of
present-day mandatory coverage.' 28 The court stated that numerous earlier West Virginia decisions had advanced the contract
theory'29 but observed that these decisions arose out of the original
voluntary coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act.' 3
"21242 S.E.2d at 446 and cases cited therein.
Id. The court expressly disapproved the holding in Sudraski v. Workmen's
Comp.Comnm'r, 116 W. Va. 441, 181 S.E. 545 (1935), where it was held:
A limitation qualifying a special statutory right ...is generally held
to be unaffected by the disabilities and excuses which allay ordinary
statutes of limitations, and to be such an inherent part of the statute
which creates the right, that the right itself does not survive the limitation.
116 W. Va. at 443, 181 S.E. at 546. The court in Lester noted that "[the literal
application of this rule would preclude fraud, or the equitable principles of waiver
and estoppel from tolling the limitation periods under the Act." 242 S.E.2d at 446.
The court concluded that Sudraski was "unnecessarily rigid and contrary to the
humanitarian purposes" of the Workmen's Compensation Act and concluded that
there was no reason to treat the limitation provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act differently from other statutes of limitation. Id. at 447.
225

226
"
22

242 S.E.2d at 447.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 447-50.

Id. at 450 n. 13 and cases cited therein.
11o
The court correctly observed that the earliest decision on the question,
Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S.E. 862 (1916), clearly distinguished the elective
"
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The court expressly disapproved its long line of prior decisions
holding that workmen's compensation coverage is based on contract. One of those cases, Loveless v. Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner,'3 ' decided only seven years prior to Lester, dealt
with a similar question. In Loveless, the claimant had been
awarded a thirty percent permanent partial disability award for
which payment was last made in June of 1969. Prior to July 1,
1970, claimants were permitted to reopen permanent disability
claims within one year of the last payment on the award.'32 On July
1, 1970, the reopening provision was extended to two times within
five years after the last payment in any permanent disability
case. ' Claimant sought to reopen his claim for further consideration in November 1970, but his petition to reopen was denied.'34
The court in Loveless stated that the contractual nature of
workmen's compensation statutes was well settled and that giving
retroactive effect to such statutes would operate to impair the
obligations of the contract.' Writing for the court, Justice Berry
observed:
It is true that purely remedial statutes which in no way
affect substantial rights are held to be retroactive in their operation. However, it has been held that statutes of limitation are
not purely remedial statutes and are no exception to the rule
that they operate prospectively.'
Despite Loveless and the long line of contract theory cases
preceding it, the court, in Lester, held that rights and duties under
the Workmen's Compensation Act will henceforth be based on the
idea of status; that is, on the law itself.'37 Having concluded that
nature of the original West Virginia Act from several mandatory state acts in effect
at the time.
"1 155 W. Va. 264, 184 S.E.2d 127 (1971).
In Act of Mar. 10, 1949, ch. 136, 1949 W. Va. Acts 601, 628.
11 Act of Feb. 12, 1970, ch. 81, 1970 W. Va. Acts 414, 430.
1" 155 W. Va. at 265-66, 184 S.E.2d at 128-29.
WsId. at 267, 184 S.E.2d at 129.

Id.

131

1" 242 S.E.2d at 451. The Lester decision differs from Loveless in that in
Lester, the claimant's claim was not barred by the prior statute of limitations at
the time the' new limitation provision became effective, while in Loveless the original limitation period had expired before the amendment became effective. Thus,
the court in Lester dealt with survival of an existing claim, while the court in
Loveless faced a question of revival of a barred claim. The Lester court was not
called upon to consider the question of barred claims but, nevertheless, chose to
comment on the question. See note 139 infra.
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workmen's compensation law is no longer based on contract, the
court finally considered the only other possible constitutional bar
to its construction of the statute-the question of whether an employer has a vested right in the limitation period in effect on the
date of injury. 3 The decision was that no person has a "vested
right in the running of a statute of limitations unless it has completely run and barred the action."'' 9
The court went on to conclude that since the employer acquired no vested right in the statute of limitations in effect on the
date of injury, the claimant could avail himself of the amended
statute and, therefore, his claim was timely filed."' The court's
decision, although a drastic reversal of the position consistently
advanced by prior courts, appears to be in line with the majority
of jurisdictions. " '
The more important issue raised by the decision is how the
court will treat the situation where a claimant's claim is barred by
the existing statute of limitations before the statute is amended by
the legislature. The court's decision implies that since the limitation period is not to be considered a part of the substantive rights
'3

Id.

'3 Id. at 452. This would seem to approve the decision in Loveless, note 131
supra.See note 137 supra.In a footnote to its decision in Lester, however, the court
observed:
We don't reach the issue of reviving an expired claim here, but
compare Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S. Ct. 209, 29 L. Ed. 483
(1885), holding a state legislature consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment may repeal or extend a statute of limitations even after the right of
action is barred under such statute, . . . with' William Danzer & Co. v.
Gulf & Ship Island R., 268 U.S. 633, 45 S. Ct. 612, 69 L. Ed. 1126 (1925)
and Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 24 S. Ct. 692, 48 L. Ed. 1067 (1904),
holding a state legislature may not extend a period of limitation after it
has expired where the limitation period is considered a part of the substantive right.
242 S.E.2d at 452 n. 15.
"1 242 S.E.2d at 452. Although apparently not necessary to its decision, the
court expressly observed that its interpretation did not constitute a retroactive
application of the law. The court, quoting from Sizemore v. Workmen's Comp.
Comm'r, 219 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1975), said:
A law is not retroactive merely because part of the factual situation
to which it is applied occurred prior to its enactment; only when it oper.
ates upon transactions which have been completed or upon rights which
have been acquired or upon obligations which have existed prior to its
passage can it be considered to be retroactive in application.
242 S.E.2d at 452.
"1 242 S.E.2d at 446 and cases cited therein.
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of the employer, a party whose claim is otherwise barred may have
2
it revived by a subsequent amendment to the limitation period.11
This is inconsistent with the court's statement that rights in a
statute of limitations become vested after the statute has run. The
final resolution of this question will have to await a proper case.
Although Lester involved an occupational pneumoconiosis claim,
it seems clear that until the court decides a case on point the
principle announced in Lester will be equally applicable to other
limitation provisions in the Act, at least insofar as those provisions
are deemed to be procedural in nature.
D.

Benefits Payable After a Permanent Total Disability Award

In the case of Cropp v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,'43 the court ruled that a permanent total disability award
does not preclude the payment of additional workmen's compensation benefits, in particular, temporary total disability benefits
for a subsequent injury. The claimant in Cropp had received
severe burns over most of his body as a result of an industrial
accident in 1965 and was granted a permanent total disability
award. Subsequently, the claimant recovered sufficiently so
that he could return to his previous employment. In 1975, the
claimant sustained an injury to his leg while at work. The Commissioner denied claimant's application for compensation benefits,
holding that the prior permanent total disability award precluded
an award of any additional compensation. The Appeal Board affirmed the Commissioner's action.
On appeal, the employer argued that even though the leg injury was compensable, Article 4, section 6 of the Act prescribes the
maximum weekly benefits payable to a worker, and precludes the
claimant from receiving additional compensation."' The court was
"I Id. at 446, 452 n. 15. See discussion at note 139 supra.
11 236 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1977).
'" W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(b) (1978 Replacement

Vol.) provides as follows:
If the injury causes temporary total disability, the employee shall receive
during the continuance thereof weekly benefits as follows: A maximum
weekly benefit to be computed on the basis of [66 2/3%] of the average
weekly earnings, wherever earned, of the injured employee, at the date
of injury, not to exceed the percentage of the average weekly wage in West
Virginia, as follows: On or after .

.

. [July 1, 1975], one hundred per-

cent.
Article 4, section 6(b) was amended, effective July 1, 1978, to provide that the
maximum weekly benefit was to be computed on the basis of 70% of the average
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not persuaded by this argument, however, and, in his opinion for
a unanimous court, Justice Miller stated that the claim was clearly
compensable and that there are no provisions in the Act which
directly limit the compensability of a second injury by virtue of the
claimant having received a life award.'45
The court, in Cropp, cited Mullens v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,'" as implicitly recognizing the rule that a life
award does not operate to terminate medical reimbursement benefits for the same injury. The Cropp court indicated that it found
no reason to distinguish that situation from the present case in
which the medical expenses related to a second industrial acci1 47
dent.
The court next considered the claimant's right to temporary
total disability benefits after receiving a life award. Here the court
was squarely confronted with the language of Article 4, section 6(k)
of the Act and the decision in Dunlap v. Workmen's Compensation
Director.148 In Dunlap the issue presented was whether temporary
total disability benefits are to be deducted from a permanent total
disability award. The claimant maintained that no offset of the
temporary benefits was required against the total award. Because
benefits for the life award would be payable from the date of the
injury, the net effect of claimant's contention would have been to
allow the claimant to receive temporary and permanent disability
benefits for the same period. The court in Dunlap ruled that Article 4, section 6(h) prohibited this double payment.' When faced
with this argument in Cropp, the court refused to overrule Dunlap
and thereby emasculate Article 4, section 6(k). Rather, the court
announced that Dunlap was not controlling and that Article 4,
section 6(k) does not apply where there are two separate, compensable injuries.' °
The language of the Cropp opinion suggests that to preclude
additional benefits where an employee has received a life award
weekly earnings of the injured employee at the time of his injury. W. VA. CODE §
23-4-6(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978).

"1236 S.E.2d at 482, 484.
'" 223 S.E.2d 604 (W. Va. 1976).
US 236 S.E.2d at 482.
Il 149 W. Va. 266, 140 S.E.2d 448 (1965).
" 149 W. Va. at 271, 140 S.E.2d at 452. Article 4, section 6(h) of the Act, in
effect at the date of the Dunlap decision is now codified in W. VA. CODE § 23-46(k) (Cum. Supp. 1978).

"1236 S.E.2d at 483.
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would discourage the employee from all attempts to re-enter the
job market, or would unfairly penalize those who are successful in
obtaining employment and are subsequently injured. It seems unlikely, however, that many aspirants to the job market will give
consideration in their decision to seek employment to whether they
will receive disability payments in the event that they are injured.
Furthermore, because permanent total and temporary total disability benefits are intended to perform a wage replacement function without completely removing the injured employee's financial
incentive to return to work, superimposing benefit upon benefit
subverts this purpose.'51
While the court in Cropp was concerned with the payment of
temporary total disability benefits for a second injury where a
claimant has previously received a life award, there is nothing in
the language or rationale of that decision to indicate that its holding should be limited to temporary benefits. Cropp has opened the
door to awards for permanent partial disability to claimants who
have already received permanent total awards and may even permit duplicate permanent total awards.
E.

Reopening of Claims

The standard of proof necessary to reopen a claim is set out
in Article 5, sections la and lb of the Act,15 which require that a
" See generally 2 A. LASON, THE LAw OF WoRKmEN's COMPENSATON at § 57.00
(1978).

152W. VA. CODE

§ 23-5-la (1978 Replacement Vol.), provides:

In any case where an injured employee makes application in writing for
a further adjustment of his claim under the provisions of section sixteen,
article four of this chapter, and such application discloses cause for a
further adjustment thereof, the commissioner shall, after due notice to
the employer, make such modifications or changes with respect to former
findings or orders in such claim as may be justified, and any party dissatisfied witli any such modification or change so made by the commission
shall, upon proper and timely objection, be entitled to a hearing, as
provided in section one of this article.
W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1b (1978 Replacement Vol.), provides:
If, however, in any case in which application for further adjustment
of a claim is filed under the next preceding section, it shall appear to the
commissioner that such application fails to disclose a progression or aggravation in the claimant's condition, or some other fact or facts which
were not theretofore considered by the commissioner in his former findings, and which would entitle such claimant to greater benefits than he
has already received, the commissioner shall, within sixty days from the
receipt of such application, notify the claimant and the employer that
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claimant's application must establish a prima facie cause for reopening the claim. Historically, this rule has been followed by the
court, and the decision of the Appeal Board in permitting or denying a reopening has been upheld unless shown to be clearly
wrong.'1
In the recent case of Harper v. Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner,54 the court expounded on the showing that must be
made by a claimant to establish a prima facie cause for reopening.
The claimant in Harperhad previously received a fifteen percent
permanent partial disability award for occupational pneumoconiosis. A medical report submitted by the claimant in connection
with his application for reopening indicated that the claimant had
developed a severe neurotic condition which his physician concluded could be related to pneumoconiosis. The report also stated
that the claimant suffered from an arthritic condition and experienced shortness of breath and dizziness.
In reversing the Commissioner and the Appeal Board, the
court held that to obtain a reopening of a claim, an employee need
only show a prima facie cause; that is, "any evidence which would
tend to justify, but not to compel, the inference that the employee
has sustained a progression or aggravation of the former injury."' 55
A broad reading of this definition will compel the Commissioner
to reopen a claim where the claimant produces any evidence from
which a progression of the injury might be inferred. Absent any
change in such interpretation, it is reasonable to assume that there
will be a significant increase in requests by employees for modification of compensation awards.
F. Horseplay
The Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the issue of the
compensability of injuries sustained as a result of horseplay or
pranks of fellow employees in the case of Sizemore v. Workmen's
such application fails to establish a prima facie cause for reopening the
claim. Such notice shall be in writing and shall state the time allowed
for appeal to the appeal board from such decision of the commissioner.
The claimant may, within thirty days after receipt of such notice, apply
to the appeal board for a review of such decision.
10 See Backus v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 154 W. Va. 79, 173 S.E.2d 353
(1970).
1- 234 S.E.2d 779 (W. Va. 1977).
lu Id. at 783.
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Compensation Commissioner." The Act requires that for an injury
to be compensable, it must occur in the course of and result from
the injured worker's employment. "7 In Sizemore, the claimant was
struck on his hard hat with a hammer handle by another worker
as a prank, and sustained a neck injury. The Commissioner held
the claim compensable, but the Appeal Board reversed, holding
that the injury was caused by an "assault" and did not result from
the claimant's employment. "'
Historically, the court has held that certain injuries resulting
from altercations between employees are not compensable.'1' In
Sizemore this line of cases was distinguished from the situation in
which an innocent employee is injured in an incident of horseplay.
The rule announced by the court is that an innocent victim of
horseplay injured during the course of his employment is entitled
to workmen's compensation benefits for that injury.
The clear implication of this decision is that in the case of
fights, pranks or other similar situations occurring on the job, an
analysis of the roles played by the individual participants is to be
made, and where an injured employee is a non-agressor, bystander
or otherwise innocent victim, he will be entitled to compensation
benefits for his injury.'60
II.

SCOPE OF THE COURT'S RmEw

Perhaps even greater than the impact of the Supreme Court
of Appeals in the area of interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act has been the court's expanding influence in cases in
which no legal question is involved-an area in which prior courts
have generally avoided review. The court's influence in this area
can best be demonstrated by: (1) its expansion of the so-called
'

235 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1977).

W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
235 S.E.2d at 473.
'' In Jackson v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 127 W. Va. 59, 31 S.E.2d 848
(1944), the court ruled that an employee who is clearly the aggressor and is injured
in an altercation with a fellow employee, is not entitled to compensation benefits.
In Claytor v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 144 W. Va. 103, 106 S.E.2d 920 (1959),
"'

"'

the court held that where an injury to an employee results from a personal quarrel
with a fellow employee, it is not compensable. For a discussion of injuries from a
fellow worker's assault as "arising out of the employment," see Comment, 10 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 133 (1953).
" This holding aligns the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals with the
majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this claim. See 1A A. LARSON, THE
LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 7.10, 23.30 (1978).
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"liberality rule," a process already begun by prior courts; and (2)
its explicit or implied utilization of the liberality rule to support
review and reversal of decisions or denial of review based solely on
the court's reconsideration of the evidence.
The "liberality rule" first appeared, in a much different form
than it appears today, in the original enactment of the workmen's
compensation statute in 1913. The 1913 statute provided:
Such commission shall not be bound by the usual common
law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal
rules of procedure, other than herein provided, but may make
the investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and
to carry out justly and liberally the spirit of this act.''
Subsequent to the enactment of the first workmen's compensation law and in one of the early decisions in that field by the
Supreme Court of Appeals, the court gave the rule a very limited
application to evidence. In Poccardi v. Public Service Commission,8' the court considered a claim in which the claimant had
allegedly sustained a hernia from lifting a pipe while at work.
The evidence was uncontroverted that claimant was in good health
prior to the incident and that lifting the pipe involved unusual
physical exertion. The physician who examined claimant was of
the opinion that the injury resulted from the strain in lifting the
pipe. The court held that where a claimant presents undisputed
evidence supporting an apparently meritorious claim, he is entitled to all reasonable inferences raised by that evidence."2 The
court expressly declined to consider the application of the rule to
a case in which conflicting evidence is presented."'
" Act of Feb. 21, 1913, ch. 10, § 44, 1913 W. Va. Acts 64, 81.
15275 W. Va. 542, 84 S.E. 242 (1915). It should be noted that the original
Workmen's Compensation Fund was administered by the Public Service Commission. See note 2 supra.The office of State Compensation Commissioner was created
in 1915. Act of Feb. 20, 1915, ch. 9, § 1, 1915 W. Va. Acts 52, 55.
"1 75 W. Va. at 545-46, 84 S.E. at 243. The court has consistently reiterated
the principle that a claimant is entitled to all reasonable inferences in his favor
which arise from undisputed evidence. Watkins v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 114
W. Va. 507, 508, 172 S.E. 715 (1934); Demastes v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 112
W. Va. 498, 501, 165 S.E. 667, 668 (1932); Goble v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 111
W. Va. 404, 408, 16 S.E. 314, 315 (1932); Machala v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r,
109 W. Va. 413, 155 S.E. 169 (1930); Caldwell v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 106
W. Va. 14, 17, 144 S.E. 568, 569 (1928). In Goble, supra, the court stressed that
inferences are permitted only when the facts are undisputed.
"1 75 W. Va. at 545, 84 S.E. at 243.
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The first case to use the term "liberality" in fashioning a rule
based on the early statutory provision was Culurides v. Ott", decided in 1916. In that case, the court reviewed the denial of compensation to dependents of a deceased workman. The workman's
wife and daughter lived on Crete. The claimant's brother originally
filed an application on her behalf and then retained an attorney
who sent an application to the claimant for her signature. It was
not returned and filed until twelve days after the time for filing had
expired.
The court held that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be
liberally construed so as to preclude denial of meritorious claims
due to technicalities."' 6 Clearly, the court's decision was limited to
liberality in the construction of the statute and was, by no stretch
of the imagination, an evidentiary rule. This interpretation of the
liberality rule was given judicial approval as recently as 1977 by
the present Supreme Court of Appeals.6 7
By the time the legislature met in 1919, the concept of a liberality rule, at least insofar as statutory construction was concerned,
was firmly entrenched in West Virginia law-so firmly, in fact,
that it survived the deletion of the supporting language from the
workmen's compensation statute. The law, as reenacted in 1919,
omitted the term "liberally" and it has not reappeared since. " '
Thus, the only statutory basis for a liberality rule disappeared
from West Virginia law nearly sixty years ago, making the tenacity
of the rule all the more amazing.'69
"

78 W. Va. 696, 90 S.E. 270 (1916).

266

Id. at 699-701, 90 S.E. at 271-72.

Dunlap v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 232 S.E.2d 343, 345 (W. Va. 1977);
Harper v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 234 S.E.2d 779 (W. Va. 1977).
" Act of Feb. 19, 1919, ch. 131, 1919 W. Va. Acts 465.
t6W. VA. CoDE § 23-1-15 (1978 Replacement Vol.), reads as follows:
The Commissioner shall not be bound by the usual common-law or
statutory rules of evidence, but shall adopt formal rules of practice and
procedure as herein provided, and may make investigations in such manner as in his judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial
rights of the parties and to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
This language has remained essentially unchanged since 1919. In Whitt v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 153 W. Va. 688, 692, 172 S.E.2d 375, 377 (1970), the court
observed that "[t]oday there is no provision in the workmen's compensation law
requiring the commissioner, the appeal board, or this Court to apply a rule of
'liberality' either in construing the workmen's compensation law or appraising the
"e

evidence in a workmen's compensation case." For an earlier discussion of the Whitt
case and the liberality rule, see Comment, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 370 (1975).
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From Culurides to the present, the court has consistently reiterated the application of the liberality rule to statutory construction.'" Until 1932, the only application of the liberality rule to the
evaluation of evidence was the "reasonable inference from uncontroverted evidence" rule first enunciated in Poccardi.7
The first major turning point in the judicial development of
the liberality rule was the court's decision in Pripichv. Workmen's
172 decided in 1932. At issue was
Compensation Commissioner,
whether the claimant's physical complaints stemmed from an
admittedly compensable injury.. The evidence was conflicting;
however, doctors who did not ascribe claimant's physical condition
to the injury were unable to relate the symptoms to any other
specific physical condition. The court held:
Where, in the course of and arising out of his employment,
an employee in good health and of strong physique suffers serious physical injury which is followed by serious disabilities,
competent physicians differing as to whether the disabilities are
attributable to the injury, but only probable or conjectural reasons or causes are assigned by physicians in an effort to explain
the disabilities on grounds other than the injury, the presumptions should be resolved in favor of the employee rather than
against him.'
Obviously, the Pripich decision goes little beyond Poccardi,
dealing basically with inferences from uncontroverted evidence. In
Fulk v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,' however, decided one week after Pripich, the court made the bald statement
that "[e]vidence should be construed liberally in favor of the
claimant," citing Pripich as the only authority.' Again, the evidence was essentially uncontroverted, and there was no apparent
reason for the court to go beyond Poccardiand Pripich with the
foregoing gratuitous language. Thus, the modern liberality rule
made its way into West Virginia case law almost by accident.
114E.g., Dunlap v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 232 S.E.2d 343, 345 (W. Va.
1977); Spaulding v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 205 S.E.2d 130, 132-33 (W. Va.
1974); Walk v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 134 W. Va. 223, 228, 58 S.E.2d 791,794
(1950); McVey v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 103 W. Va. 519, 138 S.E. 97
(1927); Sole v. Kindelberger, 91 W. Va. 603, 114 S.E. 151 (1922).
'

See notes 163 and 164 supra, and accompanying text.

"n

112 W. Va. 540, 166 S.E. 4 (1932).

'1

Id. at 543, 166 S.E. at 5.

I' 112 W. Va. 555, 166 S.E. 5 (1932).
113Id. at 556, 166 S.E. at 6.
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From the court's decision in Fulk to the advent of the present
Supreme Court of Appeals, there was little development in the
concept of a "liberality rule." The rule was generally applied in
cases in which there was no concrete evidence to refute claimant's
claim, in other words, essentially undisputed evidence. Perhaps
the best statement of the ongoing application of the rule by the
court is found in Sowder v. Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner7' where the court held:
Although the liberality rule will not take the place of evidence,
when a fair and reasonable appraisal of the evidence supports
the claimant's position the proof may be considered proper and
satisfactory.'"
The court's statement in Sowder does little more than state a mere
preponderance of the evidence standard.
Furthermore, in Pennington v. Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner,' the court noted that the liberality rule applied
"to the appraisal of evidence in compensation cases." No mention
is made of the rule's applicability to the weight of the evidence. 79
The pre-1977 state of the liberality rule, then, can best be
described as giving the claimant the benefit of the doubt in interpreting evidence in cases in which the employer presents no clear
evidence to contradict claimant's testimony. The rule was seldom
used by the Supreme Court of Appeals as the sole basis for reversing an Appeal Board finding in favor of an employee.'
155 W. Va. 889, 189 S.E.2d 674 (1972).
In Id. at 893-94, 189 S.E.2d at 677.
ITS 154 W. Va. 378, 387, 175 S.E.2d 440, 445 (1970).
'7' The case of McGeary v. Workmen's Comp. Dir., 148 W. Va. 436, 439-40,
135 S.E.2d 345, 347 (1964), is representative of the court's misunderstanding and
misapplication of the liberality rule. The court cites Caldwell v. Workmen's Comp.
Comm'r, 106 W. Va. 14, 144 S.E. 568 (1928), as authority for the proposition that
the Commissioner should construe evidence liberally in favor of the claimant. Only
a very "liberal" reading of Caldwell could reach such a conclusion. Caldwell merely
requires that the Commissioner accord the claimant reasonable inferences from
undisputed evidence.
"'1 E.g., Dombrosky v. Workmen's Comp. Dir., 149 W. Va. 343, 141 S.E.2d 85
(1965). It should be emphasized that the pre-1977 court rendered some decisions
which seem out of line with the general pattern. For example, in McGeary v.
Workmen's Comp. Dir., 148 W. Va. 436, 135 S.E.2d 345 (1964), the court considered
a case in which five physicians had recommended awards varying from forty
percent permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. The court applied the liberality rule and ordered a permanent total disability award. However,
the court observed that the physical findings of all five doctors were substantially
"1
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Since January 1, 1977, however, approximately twenty-five to
thirty percent of the decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals have been premised largely on the application of the
liberality rule. In effect, the court, although acknowledging the
principle that decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board will be upheld unless clearly wrong, has chosen to substitute
its reading of the facts for that of the Commissioner and the Appeal
Board. Thus, the court has taken a much more active role in review
of workmen's compensation cases than have prior courts.' Many
of the court's decisions have been per curiam and have included
little or no discussion of the facts.
Interestingly, in one of its early decisions the court showed a
clear understanding of the origin of the liberality rule and its limitation to statutory construction. In Harperv. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,82 Justice Miller referred to numerous decisions of the court holding the Act to be remedial and subject to
liberal construction. The court cited Culuridesv. Ott, "I as the case
which molded the liberality rule which "continues with unabated
force to govern the construction of the Act to the present day
...
"I" Finally, Justice Miller indicated that the legislature
impliedly reinforced the liberality rule in 1971 "when it stated, 'It
is also the policy of this chapter to prohibit the denial of just claims
of injured or deceased workmen or their dependents on technicalities.' "18
In Myers v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,8 , the
court dispelled any idea that it considered the liberality rule to
apply only to statutory construction. Justice McGraw, writing for
a unanimous court, stated that, although the claimant has the
burden of proof in a workmen's compensation claim, he need not
disprove all non-employment causes. That is, he need not "prove
to the exclusion of all else the causal connection between the injury
the same and at least four concluded that claimant was unable to return to his
former employment.
"I A review of the West Virginia cases for 1975 and 1976 indicates that during
that period the court decided less than ten workmen's compensation cases. From
January 1, 1977, to September 15, 1978, more than fifty cases have been decided.
18 234 S.E.2d 779 (W. Va. 1977).
'= 78 W. Va. 696, 90 S.E. 270 (1916).
"' 234 S.E.2d at 782. Clearly, the court, in Culurides, applied the liberality
rule only to statutory construction. No reference was made to its application to
evidentiary matters.
'82Id. quoting in part from W. VA. CODE § 23-5-3a (1978 Replacement Vol.).
" 239 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1977). See note 96 supra.
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and the employment."' 7 This statement standing alone is certainly correct law and does nothing more than state the standard
of proof in civil cases generally. The court, however, went on to
hold:
A spirit of liberality is to be employed in applying the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act and in construing the evidence. This principle dictates that this Court examine the record and give the claimant the benefit of all reasonable inferences the record will admit favorable to him."'
The holding in Myers goes a step beyond the Pripich decision"' which essentially limited the inferences to uncontroverted
evidence. In Lanier v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,10
however, decided six days prior to Myers, the court cited Pripich
favorably and reversed the Appeal Board's decision because no
evidence other than probable or conjectural evidence was offered
to explain claimant's disability on grounds other than the compensable injury.
It appears, then, that the liberality rule, as applied by the
present court, is a flexible rule which can be molded to fit differing
factual situations and can be used to justify the reversal of decisions which the court feels are incorrect, where no other basis for
reversal exists. A comparison of several cases is instructive.
In Hairstonv. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,9 the
claimant petitioned the Commissioner to reopen his claim in which
he had previously been granted a thirty percent award. A physician's report recommending an additional two percent award accompanied the petition. The Commissioner referred claimant to
an independent examiner who found no progression, and the Commissioner denied a further award.
The claimant objected and presented two additional physicians' reports, both of which found progression. The employer produced no further evidence. The Commissioner again denied an
additional award, and the Appeal Board affirmed. The Supreme
19 Id. at 127. See also Workman v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 236 S.E.2d 236
(W. Va. 1977), which clearly establishes both a statutory construction liberality rule
and an evidentiary liberality rule.
"'

239 S.E.2d at 126.

112 W. Va. 540, 166 S.E. 4 (1932). See text accompanying notes 172-73
supra.
190238 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1977).
M'234 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1977).
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Court of Appeals reversed with a one-sentence per curiam opinion

based solely on the fact that three of the four physicians found that
claimant had suffered progression in his condition. Therefore, the
evidence "clearly preponderated in favor of claimant."'' 2
In contrast, the court refused even to hear Stanley v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,"3 a case with virtually the
same factual situation in reverse as Hairston.In Stanley, the Commissioner's examiner recommended a forty percent award which
was granted. The employer objected. Evidence was introduced
from four physicians, all of whom said the award should not exceed
twenty-five percent. One of the physicians was the claimant's doctor. The Commissioner affirmed his original award, as did the
Appeal Board. The court then refused to hear the case despite the
overwhelming "weight" of the evidence in favor of the employer's
position. Since no reasons are given by the court for refusing to
hear appeals, one can only speculate that the liberality rule was
applied.
Likewise, in Fetty v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,'4 the court denied review of a finding of compensability
despite substantial evidence to the contrary. Claimant testified
that he had injured his back at work and had no previous history
of back injury. He further testified that he had told his foreman
and a fellow worker about the injury. Neither remembered the
conversation.
" Id. There is certainly nothing shocking about the Hairstonopinion. In fact,
the evidence does, on its face, appear to preponderate, but it is a fundamental
principle of workmen's compensation law in this state that physicians are not
authorized to fix the degree of disability in any case. Haines v. Workmen's Comp.
Comm'r, 151 W. Va. 152, 150 S.E.2d 883 (1966); McGeary v. Workmen's Comp.
Comm'r, 148 W. Va. 436, 135 S.E.2d 345 (1964). That power is granted to the
Commissioner alone and to carry out his responsibility, he must consider the
physical findings of the examining physicians and determine from all of the evidence what award, if any, the claimant should receive. Stewart v. Workmen's
Comp. Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 633, 186 S.E.2d 700 (1972); Sisk v. Workmen's Comp.
Comm'r, 153 W. Va. 461, 170 S.E.2d 20 (1969). Nowhere in the Hairstonopinion
does the court qualitatively evaluate the evidence. The court's decision, then, impliedly shifts the power to make an award to the physicians who are in the majority.
While a review of the findings of the physicians involved in Hairston might well
support the court's decision, the court gives no indication that any such consideration was given.
'"No. 10590 (appeal denied May 15, 1978). The factual summary which follows in the text is taken from Appellant's Petition for Appeal and Note of Argument.
"I No. 10714 (appeal denied May 1, 1978). The factual summary which follows
in the text is taken from Appellant's Petition for Appeal and Note of Argument.
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Claimant had completed an insurance application form for
the same injury on which he stated that the injury was not based
on a work-related accident. Furthermore, claimant's medical history as related to his several treating physicians made no reference
to the alleged injury at work. In fact, according to the record,
claimant told one doctor he had been injured about one year before
the alleged compensable injury. Finally, office records were introduced from a physician who had noted claimant's complaints of
low back pain on several occasions, long before the alleged injury.
Despite the apparent weight of the evidence, the court refused
to hear the appeal. Again, a tacit application of the liberality rule
is suggested.
A third case in which the court denied review was Knox v.
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner." Knox was an occupational disease case based on alleged exposure to chemical fumes.
The claimant testified that he had been exposed throughout his
employment and that he had never made any statements inconsistent with his testimony.
The employer, however, produced the testimony of its plant
physician who had examined claimant on numerous occasions. His
records indicated that over an eight year period claimant had consistently denied any significant exposure to fumes or any physical
problems as a result. Furthermore, claimant and his family physician had prepared non-occupational insurance benefit forms for
claimant's lung condition, and claimant received such benefits for
twenty-six weeks. Not until after the insurance benefits ran out did
claimant file a workmen's compensation claim. Finally, claimant
admitted he had smoked one package of cigarettes per day for
sixteen years. Both the Commissioner and the Appeal Board found
for claimant. The court denied review.
Although the application of the liberality rule can only be
surmised in the "review denied" cases, the court has cited the
liberality rule as its only justification for reversal in numerous
cases. " ' Most are per curiam opinions and are, therefore, difficult'
"I No. 10002 (appeal denied March 14, 1977). The factual summary which
follows in the text is taken from Appellant's Petition for Appeal and Note of Argument.
I" E.g., Lanier v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 238 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1977);
Linville v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 236 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1977); Fisher v.
Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, No. 13883 (per curiam Nov. 22, 1977); Russell v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, No. 13971 (per curiam Nov. 22, 1977); Landers v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, No. 13873 (memorandum opinion July 12, 1977); Baldwin
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to analyze. 9 ' The effect of the court's willingness to reconsider the
facts, however, is an erosion of the principle that the Supreme
Court of Appeals will not reverse a finding of fact by the Appeal
Board unless it appears from all the evidence in the claim that the
Appeal Board's finding is plainly wrong.'98 In fact, in Pirlov. Workv. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, No. 13826 (memorandum opinion June 7, 1977);
Townsend v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, No. 13817 (memorandum opinion May
10, 1977). In Eastwood v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, No. 14085 (per curiam March
21, 1978), the court applied the rule although noting that the evidence was contra.
dicted in some degree. The decision in Taylor v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, No.
13884 (per curiam Dec. 20, 1977), appears to be the only decision in which the court
has applied the liberality rule in a claimant's appeal and found it insufficient to
overcome the employer's evidence. Even in Taylor,the decision was not unanimous.
Justice McGraw dissented.
"7 A few, however, are worth mentioning. In Tompkins v. Workmen's Comp.
Comm'r, No. 13868 (per curiam Nov. 22, 1977), claimant's decedent sustained a
back injury in 1971 for which he received a forty percent award which was later
increased by fifteen percent due to psychiatric reasons. Over the three and one-half
years following his injury, he gained sixy-five pounds before dying of a heart attack
partially attributable to his increased weight. The court reversed denial of widow's
benefits to claimant and held that the back injury contributed to decedent's inactivity which, coupled with his eating, put an additional strain on his heart, which,
in turn, led to the heart attack. Thus, the death was attributable to the initial
injury and was compensable.
In Hem v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, No. 13846 (per curiam June 28, 1977),
the claimant sustained a back injury on December 25, 1968, which injury was
subsequently held compensable. He was referred to the Commissioner's examiner
who found no permanent partial disability, and an order to that effect was entered.
Claimant objected and produced a report from an osteopath recommending further
treatment and finding a five percent disability at the time. The employer moved,
without opposition, to hold the claim open until the treatment was complete. The
motion was granted. Claimant agreed to provide a supplemental disability report
after the treatment was complete, but did not do so. In 1974, claimant produced
the testimony of a physician who had last seen him in 1971, prior to claimant's
further treatment. That physician reported no clinical findings of impairment but
recommended a five percent award based on a predisposition to future injuries of
the same sort. Finally, in 1975, another physician examined claimant and found
no disability.
The Commissioner granted claimant a five percent disability award on February 27, 1976. The employer appealed. The Appeal Board set aside the Commissioner's order and held that no permanent disability had resulted from the injury.
Claimant appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The court
originally held that the Appeal Board was clearly wrong in holding the injury not
compensable, a holding neither the Commissioner nor the Appeal Board made.
Subsequently, the employer petitioned for a rehearing. The rehearing was denied,
but the court entered a corrected order citing the liberality rule and reinstating the
five percent award.
I's Willard v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 114, 181 S.E.2d 278
(1971); Backus v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 154 W. Va. 79, 173 S.E.2d 353 (1970).
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9
men's Compensation Commissioner,"'
Justice McGraw observed

that "[w]hile a finding of fact by the Appeal Board is not to be
disturbed unless shown to be clearly wrong, such a rule is not
applicable where the facts are undisputed, and the record
will
' '2
admit of reasonable inferences favorable to the claimant.
Unquestionably, the impact of the present Supreme Court of
Appeals has been as great or greater in the field of workmen's
compensation law as in any other area. Perhaps its greatest effect
within that field has been the further development of the liberality
rule into a substitute for evidence on behalf of the claimant. The
court has often reviewed the evidence on claimants' appeals and
apparently substituted its judgment for that of the Appeal Board
and the Commissioner in numerous cases. A likely effect of the
court's activity is to increase the number of claimants' appeals and
to decrease the number of appeals by employers. 21' Certainly the
liberality rule as construed by the present court has become a
factor to be given great weight by attorneys representing both sides
in determining the advisability of an appeal.
It is apparent from a review of decisions since January 1, 1977,
that the present West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
adopted an activist philosophy at least insofar as workmen's compensation is concerned. The court has entered into areas not ordi242 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1978).
Id. at 454.
21,
Such an effect is suggested by a review of the records of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals from January 1, 1973, through September 14, 1978. In
1973, employees and employers sought review of thirty decisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board. Employee appeals that year accounted for twenty of
those thirty cases, while employers requested review of ten cases. These statistics
increased slightly in 1974 to a total of thirty-three cases wherein review was requested. Employees appealed in twenty-one of those cases and employers appealed
in twelve cases. The 1975 term witnessed a significant increase in the total number
of appeals and specifically, in the number of employee appeals. Out of the fiftyseven cases wherein review was requested, nearly seventy-seven percent, or fortyfour out of fifty-seven cases, were appealed by employees. Comparing this figure to
the previous year's figures, employee appeals doubled. Employers in 1975 sought
review of only thirteen cases, an increase of only one case from the previous year.
There were fifty-one appeals in 1976, a slight decrease from the total in 1975, but
the relative number of appeals taken by employees and employers remained constant-employees still accounted for a much greater percentage of appeals
(seventy-one percent) than did employers (twenty-nine percent). The period from
January 1, 1977, through September 15, 1978, has not seen an increase in the total
number of appeals, but the percentage of appeals prosecuted by employees has
shown a significant increase and the percentage of appeals prosecuted by employers
has shown a significant decrease over the same time period. See note 3 supra.
"
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narily considered to be within the scope of appellate review. It has
given little consideration to the fact-finding role of the Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board, preferring to substitute its own review of the facts. It has also chosen to redefine well-settled statutory interpretations and, in the process, has, on occasion, usurped
the role of the legislature. Such a philosophy erodes the principle
of stare decisis and undermines the stability that is the hallmark
of our common law system.
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